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EXECUTED WITH NEATNESS AND DESPATCH.

SPEECH

MR. BENTON, OF MISSOURI.

[CONCLUDED.]

This is the purchase money paid; and it is all that I propose to count in this argument; for it is sufficient for the argument, though not all that belongs to the argument. The value of other lands given in exchange, and the cost of getting possession, both belong to the argument, and far exceed in amount the total of the purchase money paid. Thus Florida cost, in money, \$6,480,000; but to this must be added Texas proper, and the country between the Red River and Arkansas which was given in exchange, and the cost of getting possession of Florida, which already three times exceeds the price of the possession not yet obtained. So of other purchases upon a smaller scale.

The whole amount of money received from the sales of lands, as I have shown heretofore, is but one hundred and four millions of dollars; so that here is a clear deficiency of eight millions of dollars under the head of paying for themselves. Add to this the twenty-eight millions distributed among the States, and the deficiency is thirty-six millions. And if to this we should still add, as we fairly might, the value of the lands given in exchange to Spain and the Indians, and the cost of getting possession of our purchases after we had made them, and the deficiency is many hundreds of millions. But I limit the argument to the sums paid out for purchases, and received back for sales.

Thus the lands are proved to have answered no part of their destination—to have paid no part of the public debt—not even to have defrayed the expenses of their own acquisition and management—and that they are at this time largely in debt to the customs. This is a charge upon them which they ought to pay; and it constitutes, a strong objection to their alienation from Federal and application to local purposes. It is a strong objection, but not the strongest, to this alienation. A far stronger one is found in the fact that all the lands held by the United States have been purchased; that they are PURCHASES, and not GIFTS, and have all been acquired by giving money for them. Now it is agreed that this money could not have been divided among the States before it was given for the land; and if so, is it possible that we can effect the division after it has been given for land by the simple process of reconverting the land into money? If so, then have we found out a most facile and flexible method of getting rid of Constitutional obstructions!

In round numbers the sum of one hundred and twelve millions have been paid for the public lands, and the largest part of that sum for those which are called donations. To the Indians there have been paid seventy-two millions of dollars, and this to extinguish their titles to the lands presented by the States to the Federal Government; and this independent of the annuities yet to be paid, and which represent a capital of several millions. These Indian purchases have cost far more than Louisiana and Florida put together. They result from the cessions of the States—cessions which have generally been treated as donations of the lands when they were nothing but a transfer of the right to purchase them from the Indians. The States did not own the soil; the Indians were the acknowledged owners. All that the States claimed in the soil was the right of purchase from the Indians, and that right they ceded to the United States. Some States would not cede that right, as Massachusetts and Connecticut; and these have held on to the soil, and have sold, or are selling it, for their own advantage. Massachusetts and Maine now derive an annual income from the sale of their lands. Connecticut has received a large sum from hers. It was Virginia and Georgia that made the largest and most effective cessions, which ceded the right of purchase to the most extensive territories; and dearly enough has the United States paid for the privilege of buying the Indian titles to what they ceded. Almost the whole of the seventy-two millions paid to Indians has gone for the extinction of their titles to the Virginia and Georgia cessions; a mere fragment of it has gone to the Indians of Florida and Louisiana. The Indians of Southern States, and of the Northern West, have received almost the whole; and besides this, Georgia received in money and Mississippi land scrip \$3,082,000 for her cession, besides the obligation to extinguish the Indian title to their lands within her limits for her own benefit. Thus it is clear that the cessions from the States were not donations of land, but cessions of jurisdiction; with the transfer of the right to acquire from the Indians the soil within their ancient colonial boundaries, and which, in regard to the limits of the State, were generally ex-territorial. The sum paid to the Indians, and the Indians, and that paid to Georgia, make about seventy-five millions of dollars which the purchases of the Indian titles

have cost us; while the purchases from France and Spain, the interest included, barely amount to thirty millions. The expense of managing the whole has amounted to about eight millions; making a total for the cost and management of the lands of about one hundred and twelve millions of dollars.

I have gone over these details to establish a fact, and which fact is vital to the argument, that the whole of the lands owned by the United States are purchases, not donations; that they represent money drawn from the Treasury and invested in land, and now wearing the shape of acres in the woods instead of dollars in the Treasury. This is a fact now established. Here, then, are one hundred and twelve millions of dollars laid out for land, and now represented by land. Here are one hundred and twelve millions of dollars converted into land; and this brings us to the great constitutional error on this point. Before it was so converted, every one admits that it could not have been divided among the States. Every one admits that. Now, the question is, can we divide the land? or, reconvert it into money, and divide the dollars? Can we cheat the Constitution by this transmutation? Can we cheat ourselves, and the country, by such specimens of legislative alchemy and political juggling? If so, we have discovered a very facile way of helping ourselves to all that the Treasury contains. We may begin with the one hundred and twelve millions at once, and then proceed, converting and reconverting, buying land and selling land, until we have bought and divided that billion of acres, estimated at a billion and a quarter of dollars, which figured so largely in the debates on the land bills when they were first introduced, and when the national domain was presented as a bait to national cupid-

ity. This would seem to be enough; a billion and a quarter would seem to be enough; but it is only the beginning of what may be done under this new process of converting, and reconverting, the Federal revenues, and then dividing them. It is the beginning only of what may be done in this new school of alchemy, with our Constitution in its crucible. The transmutation may be made to reach all other property owned, or to be owned, by the United States; for the same clause which gives Congress authority to dispose of the territory, also gives it authority to dispose of all other property, belonging to the United States. Here then is a new and boundless field for obtaining money for distribution. Forts, arsenals, armories, magazines, arms, and munitions of war: fleets, ships, docks, navy yards, and naval stores; barracks and hospitals; public edifices of all kinds, including the Capitol in which we sit; light-houses; bank stock, canal stock, road stock; every thing, in fact, which comes under the name of property, and which we now possess, or may choose to acquire; all this may be thrown into the legislative crucible, transmuted from an unconstitutional to a constitutional subject of distribution, and forthwith partitioned out among the States. Bills to divide the proceeds of the sales of "other property" may then become as familiar to our legislation as bills to divide the proceeds of the public lands now are; and instead of limiting our distributions to the States, what is to prevent us from extending the favor to corporate bodies, to individuals, and to the children of meritorious parents? Once descended from the safe and elevated mark of national objects, where is the limit, where the boundary which is to arrest the downward course of the application of the national funds. One admitted that Congress is free from all constitutional control in disposing of the "territory and other property" of the Union, and what is there to guard the application of unbounded means, directed by unbounded power? What is there to prevent largesses and benefactions, in the shape of national munificence, to warriors, statesmen, poets, sculptors, musicians? What to prevent hereditary provision for the support of families, in the shape of hereditary pensions to successive generations for ancestral services? We touch the confines of an hereditary pension list at this moment; having already an ancestral list which 44,000 names now encumber; and let it be granted to Congress to do what it pleases, uncontrolled by the Constitution with the territorial domain, and all the other property of the Union, and from that instant a pension list of forty-four thousand names, and three and a half millions of dollars, will quickly be extended and increased, and stretched into the ranks of posterity. No, sir, no. There is no constitutional way to assume these State debts, or to pay them, or to endorse them, or to smuggle the money to the States for that purpose, under the pretext of dividing land revenue, or surplus revenue, among them. There is no way to do it. The whole thing is constitutionally impossible. It was never thought of by the framers of our Constitution. They never dreamed of such a thing. There is not a word in their work to warrant it, and the whole idea of it is utterly repugnant and offensive to the objects and purposes for which the Federal Union was framed.

Sir, I repeat it: The Federal Constitution grew out of the want of money for the uses of the Federal Government. It grew out of that want, and nothing else; and it contains no grant of power in relation to the collection or the application of money, except for the uses and purposes of the Federal Government itself.

Having established the constitutional objection to assumption, naked or disguised, and shown that there was no difference between diverting land revenue and any other Federal revenue to State purposes, and having especially exploded the three vulgar errors, that the lands were donated from the States, that they have fulfilled their destination in paying the public debt, and that the power of Congress is absolute and arbitrary over them; having done this, I proceed to the

secondary class of objections; namely, the evils of the measure. There evils are in themselves so great, so hostile to the general good, and so even if there was no constitutional impediment in the way, this measure of assumption, or provision for State debts, should be utterly rejected for its baleful consequences alone. And here it is proper to pause, to reflect, to look back upon the page of our own history, and to consult the experience of our own ancestors in relation to paying State debts, before we rush into the same business. We have had one assumption in our country, and that in a case which was small in amount, and free from the impediment of a constitutional objection; but which was attended by such evils as should deter posterity from imitating the example. It was in the first year of the Federal Government and although the assumed debts were only twenty millions, and were alleged to have been contracted for general purposes, yet the assumption was attended by circumstances of intrigue and corruption, which led to the most violent dissension in Congress, suspended the business of the two Houses, drove some of the States to the verge of secession, and menaced the Union with instant dissolution. Mr. Jefferson, who was a witness of the scene, and who actual dangers of the country, into its temporary support, thus describes it:

"This game was over, (funding the soldiers' certificates) and another was on the carpet at the moment of my arrival; and to this I was most ignorantly and innocently made to hold the candle. This fiscal manœuvre was well known by the name of the assumption. Independently of the debts of Congress the States had during the war, contracted separate and heavy debts, &c. &c. This money, whether wisely or foolishly spent, was pretended to have been spent for general purposes, and ought therefore to be paid from the general purse. But it was objected, that nobody knew what these debts were, what their amount, or what their proofs. No matter; we will guess them to be twenty millions. But of these twenty millions, we do not know how much should be reimbursed to one State or how much to another. No matter; we will guess. And so another scramble was set on foot among the several States, and some got more, some little, some nothing. This measure produced the most bitter and angry contests ever known in Congress, or since the union of the States. The great and trying question, however, was lost in the House of Representatives. So high were the feuds excited by this subject, that on its rejection business was suspended. Congress met and adjourned from day to day without doing any thing, the parties being too much out of temper to do business together. The Eastern members particularly, who, with South from South Carolina, were the principal gamblers in this scheme, threatened a secession and dissolution. It was finally agreed that whatever importance had been attached to the rejection of this proposition, the States, was more important; and that, therefore, it would be better that the vote of rejection should be rescinded; to effect which, some members should change their votes. But it was observed that this bill would be particularly bitter to the Southern States, and that some little to them. There had before been propositions to fix the seat of Government either at Philadelphia, or at Georgetown, on the Potomac; and it was thought that by giving it to Philadelphia for ten years, and to Georgetown permanently afterwards, this might, as an antidote, calm in some degree the ferment which might be excited by the other measure alone. So two of the Potomac members (White and Lee, but White with a revulsion of stomach almost convulsive) agreed to change their votes, and Hamilton undertook to carry the other point; and so the assumption was passed, and twenty millions of stock divided among the favored States and thrown in as a palatium to the stockjobbing herd. Still the machine was not complete; the effect of the funding system and of the assumption would be temporary; it would be lost with the loss of the individual members who had been enriched; and some engine of influence more permanent must be contrived which these myrmidons were yet in place to carry it through. This engine was the Bank of the United States."

What a picture is here presented! Debts assumed in the gross, without knowing what they were in the mass, or what in detail—Congress in a state of disorganization, and all business suspended for many days—secession and disunion openly menaced—compromise of interest—intrigue—buying and selling of votes—conjunction of parties to pass two measures together, neither of which could be passed separately—speculators infesting the halls of legislation, and openly struggling for their spoil—the funding system a second time sanctioned and fastened upon the country—jobbers and gamblers—in stocks enriched—twenty millions of additional national debt created—and the establishment of a National Bank insured. Such were the evils attending a small assumption of twenty millions of dollars, and that in a case where there was no constitutional impediment to be evaded or surmounted. What, then, must be expected when the assuming is to begin with hundreds of millions—is to reach a billion—is to cover, in the end, all sorts of State debts, and is to be attended with flagrant breaches, derisive evasions, of the Constitution?

With this retrospective view of the mischiefs of a former assumption, in a case so much more mitigated, I proceed to the evils of the new one, disguised as a distribution of land revenue among the States, and a provision for the payment of their internal improvement debts. In taking up, in the first place, the nature and amount of the State debts for which the Federal aid or guarantee is claimed—the purposes for which they were created—their present value at home and abroad—and the proportions in which they are distributed among the several States. And here I avail myself of the valuable and authentic information collected by an eminent citizen of New York, the Comptroller of the State, Mr. Flagg. As late Comptroller, it became his duty, under the general banking law of the State, to issue circulating bank notes to banking companies on receiving from them pledge of State stocks. The proper execution of this duty required him to become acquainted with the State stocks, and for this purpose he applied to the fiscal authorities of each ward, and received the answers which he afterwards embodied into the document which now

constitutes the magazine of information from which we all obtain our knowledge on this subject. His report showed the astounding sum of one hundred and seventy millions of debt contracted or authorized by eighteen of the States, (in reality by sixteen, as two of them owe but a trifle,) and that without counting the twenty-eight millions received on deposits from the Federal Government. This was above a year ago; and, incurred since, with the Florida debt of five millions, and some other species of debt, the whole may now be estimated at more than two hundred millions of dollars. But confining my remarks to the amount which appears in the tables of Mr. Flagg, and it is seen that this large amount of debt was found in the States of Maine, Massachusetts, New-York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Michigan. Eight of the States of the Union, namely, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, and Georgia, enjoy the proud and enviable distinction of not finding their names on the indebted list. Maine and Missouri are only nominally on the unhappy list; the former having created but half a million of debt, and the latter having sent out her bonds too late to be sold, and a good portion of them remaining yet in the power of the State to recall and cancel. Sixteen may be taken then as the number of indebted States, and 170 millions the amount which they owe; but of these sixteen, only thirteen are involved in the species of debt now proposed to be provided for, namely, the internal improvement debt.

We now take up the tables of Mr. Flagg. The objects to which these 170 millions are applicable, and the amount for each object, are these:

For banking	\$52,640,000
For canals	60,201,551
For railroads	42,871,084
For turnpikes and McAdam roads	6,618,958
For miscellaneous objects	8,474,684
The proportions among the different States are:	
Maine	\$554,976 00
Massachusetts	4,200,000 00
New York	18,262,406 00
Pennsylvania	27,306,790 00
Maryland	11,402,930 73
Virginia	6,662,089 00
South Carolina	5,753,270 12
Alabama	10,800,000 00
Louisiana	23,735,000 00
Tennessee	7,148,166 66
Kentucky	7,360,000 00
Ohio	6,101,000 00
Indiana	11,590,000 00
Missouri	11,600,000 00
Mississippi	2,500,000 00
Arkansas	7,000,000 00
Michigan	3,000,000 00

The proportionate increase of the whole debt, in successive periods of five years and three years, from 1820 to 1838, is this:

From 1820 to 1825,	\$12,790,728
" 1825 to 1830,	13,679,680
" 1830 to 1835,	40,002,760
" 1835 to '38, (say 3 1-2 yrs.)	108,223,808

The detail of the debt, with the amount incurred by each State, for each object, is this:

STATE.	For Banking	For Canals	For Railroads	For Turnpikes	Miscellaneous	Total
New York	\$13,310,627	\$3,727,750	\$4,004,851	\$3,005,302	\$1,152,028	\$25,200,558
Pennsylvania	10,509,927	4,500,000	5,500,000	2,125,000	531,076	\$23,165,903
Massachusetts	5,700,000	3,585,350	1,500,000	2,000,000	334,999	\$13,115,349
Virginia	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
South Carolina	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Alabama	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Louisiana	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Tennessee	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Kentucky	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Ohio	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Indiana	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Missouri	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Mississippi	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Arkansas	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000
Michigan	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	1,100,000	\$9,500,000

Such are the amounts, and the distribution among States and objects, and the progressive increase of these State debts. Having seen these particulars—having viewed the debt in its gross and in its detail—the next thing I propose to examine is to see what the States received in return for such enormous liabilities; what it is that repays themselves now at home; and what the proceeds of the lands are to be divided among the States. And here I can say in grief, and with sorrow, that almost the whole amount of what the States received was British dry goods—mere British dry goods—not even groceries. I say it with grief, and with sorrow, that

almost the whole amount of what the sixteen States received for their sterling bonds, bearing a sterling interest which will not be less than ten per cent. to the people who pay it, was British dry goods, which have been sold for paper money to construct roads and canals, and to build up paper system banks. This is what we have got for 170,000,000 of sterling debt. The process was about this: The bonds were sold for bank credits in Europe and the Atlantic cities; bills of exchange were drawn upon these credits in favor of merchants who took up the amount in dry goods; the bills of exchange were paid for by the merchants in paper money; and this paper money, after some time, returned to the banks from which it came. Thus, the whole operation was a circle of paper, going round and round in paper, and ending in its own extinction, and never emerging from the paper circle but once, and then to effect importations of British goods. The goods are worn out; the paper money has returned to the place from whence it came; the operation is over; and nothing remains of the State debts, but the 170,000,000 of debt, its devouring interest, and the banks, canals and roads which represent it. The whole of these banks have failed once, and most of them twice, in two years; the greater part of the roads and canals are unproductive. And this is the history of the State debts, the burden of which it is now proposed to cast upon the shoulders of the Federal Government. But the whole of these debts are not even the direct debt of the State, but a security debt incurred for companies, corporations, and individuals to whom the State credit, that is to say, the State bonds, have been lent to enable them to build banks, and make improvements, or engage in some speculative undertaking, for which they had no means of their own. A part of the State debts is in this form; and that part becomes doubly objectionable to me from its intrinsic unworthiness, and inherent viciousness. I have yet to discover, in the Constitutions of such of the States as I have examined for the purpose, the power by which the Legislature undertakes to lend the credit of the State, that is to say, the labor and property of the people, to companies, corporations, and individuals, for their private advantage, and to make the community stand security for the success of their undertakings. I question the power in the States; I deny it where the authority cannot be shown; and I utterly deny it in the Congress of the United States. As to the wisdom of such loans and security, that may be seen in many instances, and especially in some Southern banks, and above all, in a certain railroad project in Florida, where the Legislative Council first granted a charter for the road, and then furnished the bonds to build it, and wherein the corporators sold the bonds in Europe for iron then obtained a remission of duties from Congress, then sold the iron on their own account, and afterwards demanded more bonds for commencement of the road. This, though an extreme case, is not the only instance which time will develop of the improvidence of such loans and securities. Like many other leaders, the State may lose; like many other endorers, she may have to pay. The undertaking may fail in many instances; and a wasteful prodigality in spending the money so obtained must be expected in all. Yet these constitute a part of the State debts for the payment of which Congress will be called on to provide.

Such are the representatives of the State debts. These are what the States have realized in exchange for their sterling bonds and sterling interest. The best of the banks are doing but little; the best of the roads and canals are hardly paying repairs, management, and interest. The mass of these institutions and works may be thus characterized: Barren banks, which cannot lend; suspended banks, which will not pay; broken banks, which cannot pay; unfinished roads and canals, which are useless; finished ones, which are either bringing their owners in debt, or barely paying the expense of repairs, the cost of management, and interest upon the outlay. This is their condition. Their value at home is shown by the thermometer of the stock market, where they range at all the degrees below par, down to the freezing point of zero. In Europe, although backed by the credit of States, they rate from one-half to three-fourths of their nominal value; and this is the stock which the Federal Government is to be called upon to raise to pay, or above it, for the benefit of the holders in Europe, while the representatives of this stock in America—the banks, the roads, and the canals—are to remain as they are, to be galvanized into a new fit of ephemeral animation, by the battery of new debts, contracted abroad. It is for this that the assumption is to be claimed—no, not the assumption is to be claimed—no, not the assumption—that word will not be used here. The pen of Mr. Jefferson has stamped upon it an immortality of infamy, and it will not be repeated here. The public lands will be invoked for that purpose; and, by this indirection, the national domain will virtually be presented as a gift to the capitalists of Europe; and not to the capitalists only, but to the stockjobbing fry also—that pestilential spawn of the funding and paper systems—which, having so often mastered the Parliament of Great Britain, are next to try their hand on the Congress of the United States. A diversion of the nation domain to the payment of these debts, would immediately raise them far above par—would be a present of 50 or 60 cents on the dollar, and of 50 or 60 millions in the gross—to the foreign holders, and, virtually, a present of so much public land to them. It is in vain for the bill to say that the proceeds of the lands are to be divided among the States. The indebted State will deliver their portion to their creditors; they will send it to Europe; they will be nothing but the Receiver General and the Sub-Treasurers of the bankers and stockjobbers of London, Paris, and of Ala-

sterdam. The proceeds of the sales of lands will go to them. The hard money, wrung from the hard hand of the Western cultivator, will go to these foreigners; and the whole influence of these foreigners will be immediately directed to the enhancement of the price of our public lands, and to the prevention of the passage of all the laws which go to graduate their price, or to grant pre-emptive rights to the settlers.

Let us now take a rapid view of the evils of this assumption, disguised as it may be with the cloak of the national domain revenue for distribution, or with drapery of a surplus revenue for division, or deposit, among the States. I have already grouped into a single assemblage of features the more prominent and palpable of these evils, and shall not stop to dilate minutely upon them now. The bare presentation of the picture is enough to fill the mind with the most painful and disquieting apprehensions. What more revolting than to compel the non-indebted States to incur burthens for others which they have refused to incur for themselves? What more shocking than this? Yet such is the proposition, disguise it as you may, which is to be brought before us. Fourteen of the State only are indebted for internal improvements; for four of those whose names are on the indebted list owe nothing on that head. Maine, Missouri, Mississippi, and Arkansas, owe nothing for roads and canals, to which Louisiana might be added; for she owes but a trifle on that head, little more than half a million of dollars. Here, then, are thirteen States which are in debt for internal improvements, the only kind of debts now proposed to be provided for, and thirteen which are not; and the proposition will be to make them all even by plunging the whole into the same degree of debt. It would be rather too monstrous to require the thirteen non-indebted to assume the one-half of the debts of the other thirteen. That would be rather outrageous. A different turn must, therefore, be given to the scheme; and the non-indebted States seduced into debt to an equal amount with the others, and then the whole of the States made paymaster for the whole of the debts. This is the fine scheme which is now to occupy us; and a national debt of three hundred millions created at once (for that is the sum computed to be wanting) to equalize the condition of the States in point of indebtedness. That which is now one hundred millions on thirteen of the States, is to be made three hundred millions on the whole; and these three hundred millions are to constitute the starting point of a new national debt, and the kernel of the new National Bank. Truly, we are but at the commencement of the "credit system."

What can be more obvious than that diversion of the land revenue from national to State purposes, will create a necessity for loans, or taxes, or issues of Treasury notes, to supply the place of the funds so diverted? The lands now produce six or seven millions annually, and with a reduction of price, will produce an increased sum to meet the deficiencies of the custom-house revenue in the two last years of the compromise, which are now at hand. Both lands and customs barely meet the demands of the Government at this time; what then must be the state of the revenue in 1841 and 1842, if thrown exclusively upon the customs, then, undergoing their last reduction, and sunk to an ad valorem duty of 20 per cent. Doubtless the revival of a heavy tariff must ensue; and this is so obvious to every observer, that it must be assumed to be one of the objects of diverting the land revenue from Federal to State purposes.

What can be more demoralizing, more ruinous, and more destructive, not only to our Federal political system, but to the social and moral system itself, than to allow the States to create debts for their own purposes, and then club together and throw the payment of these debts on the Federal Government? What more fatal than this? The restraint upon the creation of debt is the obligation to pay it. Remove that restraint—separate the characters of contractor and payer—and all the barriers of economy, moderation and safety are broken down. The States are stimulated into debts which the Union is to pay; and the precedent once set, must be rapidly followed up by the debts on the part of the States, and new assumptions on the part of the Union. We begin with providing for internal improvement debts; quickly those incurred for banks are added. Then follow all those contracted for "other purposes," even the security debts incurred by loans of credit to companies, corporations, and individuals, no matter how unwisely incurred, how extravagantly applied, and how wastefully squandered.

Touch these State debts in any way, no matter how—put you hand to the work in any form that you please—and from that moment you are in for the whole; from that moment you assume the ultimate payment. Thus it was with the debt of this District incurred for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. We passed an act in 1823, to enable the District to borrow the money. The sagacious men of this body—Mr. Macon, Mr. Van Buren, and others—opposed the act, upon the ground that the agent of the District would go abroad with that act in his hand, and show it to foreign capitalists; and although it contained no promise on our part to guaranty the payment, yet the United States would become involved in the transaction, and ultimately have to pay it all; and thus it happened. That debt, interest, and all, is now assumed by the United States. I was one of the few who opposed it, thanks to my association with Macon and Randolph, from whom I learnt my leading principles in political economy. I opposed that act, giving authority to this District to borrow money for the canal, on the ground that it would involve us in the transaction, and ultimately make us liable for the whole; and now I oppose any connection, disguised as it may be, with the State debts, on the same ground. Touch them, and we embrace them; put our finger to the work, and the shoulders follow; give them the proceeds of the public lands, and from that moment you have given the whole revenues and the whole credit of the United States. You have given all, in giving any thing; for all the rest would follow. Custom-house revenue and Treasury notes would soon be called in to supply the deficiency of the land revenue; and new debts would swallow up the whole resources of the Union.

What more unwise and more unjust than to contract debts on long time, as some of the States have done, thereby invading the rights and mortgaging the resources of posterity, and loading unborn generations with debts not their own? What more unwise than all this, which several of the States have done, and which the effort now is to make all do? Besides the ultimate burthen in the shape of final payment, which is intended to fall upon posterity, the present burthen is incessant in the shape of annual interest, and falling upon each generation, equals the principal in every periodical return of ten or a dozen years. Few have calculated the devouring effect of annual interest on public debts, and considered how soon it exceeds the principal. Who supposes that we have paid near three hundred millions of interest on our late national debt, the principal of which never rose higher than one hundred and twenty-seven millions, and remained but a year or two at that? Who supposes this? Yet it is a fact that we have paid four hundred and thirty-one millions for principal and interest of that debt; so that near three hundred millions, or near double the maximum amount of the debt itself, must have been paid in interest alone; and this at a moderate interest varying from three to six per cent, and payable at home. Some of the States, on the contrary, engage to pay six or seven per cent, in London, which must require a levy of nine or ten per cent, from their citizens to raise and remit to the place of payment. The States counted on seeing this interest paid, and the debt itself ultimately redeemed, by the profits of the banks, the roads, canals, and jobbing companies, and projectors, for which and for whom they were contracted. Vain and illusory expectation! A few of the works may yield a profit, and realize the calculation made upon them; but as to the mass of these undertakings, they must sink upon the hands of the States. As to the banks, most of them must rot down upon their foundations before the bonds are due upon which they were built; and as the jobbers and projectors to whom the State credit was lent, most of them, when they have squandered the money for which the bonds were sold, will quietly leave the State to pay both principal and interest. Such is the impvidence of lending State credit, and contracting debts upon long time, and throwing their payment upon unborn generations. And this is what sixteen of our States have been doing, and what it is proposed to make the whole twenty-six now do. The British national debt owes its existence entirely to this policy. It was but a trifle in the beginning of the last century, and might have been easily paid during the reigns of the first and second George; but the policy was to fund it, that is to say, to pay the interest annually, and send down the principal to posterity; and the fruit of that policy is now seen in a debt of four thousand five hundred millions of dollars, with some millions of people without bread, while an army, a navy, and a police, sufficient to fight all Europe, is kept under pay, to hold in check and subordination the oppressed and plundered ranks of their own population. And this is the example which the transferers of the State debt would have us to imitate, and this the end to which they would bring us!

What can be more plain than that, in providing for these debts of the States, we begot a spirit which must constantly cater for the means of new distribution, by keeping down necessary appropriations, and keeping up unnecessary taxes? Of this we have experience for our instruction, as well as theory for our guide. The land distribution bills a few years ago, and the deposit bill of 1836, begot such a spirit in Congress, that all the fortification bills were lost for several years, and one of them actually sunk between the Houses, after passing the Senate, by having a new deposit bill fastened upon it; and a bill for the repeal of three millions of dollars of taxes, including the salt tax, was also lost, while the complaint of the Treasury was an excessive revenue, and a surplus for which there was no use!

Who cannot see that the diversion of the land revenue from the Federal Treasury is to be attended with the immediate revival of the high protective tariff, falling unequally on different parts of the Union, and most heavily on the planting, grain growing, and provision raising States? And who does not see that the revival of that tariff is to give the highest discontent to the overburthened parts of the Union, and excite in their bosoms a deep and just degree of dissatisfaction?

[Concluded on the fourth page.]

From the Eastern Argus.

A PAIR OF SLANDERS.

The notorious *Matthew L. Davis*, the "Spy at Washington," the correspondent and creature of the Bank-bought Webb, the friend and biographer of Aaron Burr, and the originator of the controversy which ended in the murder of the lamented Cilley—this shameless slanderer, as the public knows him; this "venerable Mr. Davis," as the York County Herald courteously terms him, is out upon Governor Fairfield, in the New York Courier and Enquirer, for having recently called upon the President to protect the State of Maine from invasion. The Gov. he insolently asks, made the call only for political effect, and knew when he made it, that the assistance he asked, not only would not be granted, but was not in reality at all necessary. In other words, this hoary-headed defamer declares that Gov. Fairfield has published, in relation to this matter, a "deliberate and wilful falsehood!" Is there a man in the State who does not feel indignant at the insult and ashamed of its calumniating author? Is there an individual in Maine who can, we do not say tolerate, but who does not deeply scorn the charge? If we had been asked these questions a week ago, we might have risked an answer to them in the negative. We did not then know the extent of political malignity which belongs to the conductors of the *York County Herald*. That paper not only endorses the calumny of the "venerable Mr. Davis," but even adds to it, & dwells upon it with apparent rapture! Nay, it asserts the same slanderous charge in two or three different forms. Not satisfied with approving it in an extract, it embodies it in an editorial, and thus brings it before its readers in the most prominent manner possible. After noticing the last letter of Mr. Fox to Mr. Forsyth, it adds the following comments:

"Thus has this whole affair, about which such a breeze has lately been made, been blown into nothing. It turns out that there has as yet been no invasion and no warlike movements on the part of the British authorities; and we shall not be at all surprised, if in the end it turns out that Gov. Fairfield has known from the beginning that no invasion has been made or intended."

Here then the Herald blames Gov. Fairfield for "making a breeze," about an invasion of our State! Just as if an invasion was a matter not worth mentioning at all, and by no means worth mentioning to the President of the U. States!

But the Herald says, "there has been no invasion." How does it know this—where is the evidence of it? Why, Mr. Fox says so in his last letter. And so because Mr. Fox chooses now to deny what he tacitly admitted a short time ago, and what Sir John Harvey and the Provincial papers have concurred in asserting, the Herald jumps very willingly to the conclusion that the denial is correct, and that there has indeed been no invasion! It does not admit for a moment that Mr. Fox can be in error, and deems it, doubtless, altogether impossible that he should be "wilfully so!" It has too much confidence, beyond question, in the representative of her Majesty, to believe him capable of uttering what he does not know! Gov. Fairfield, however, having nothing to do with any majesty but the majesty of right, and being withal a plain sort of a man, the Herald has no confidence in him whatever, and does not hesitate to accuse him of a public, official falsehood! So much less respect does it manifest for the Chief Magistrate of its own State, than for the haughty dignity of a foreign court.

But suppose there has been no invasion, was Gov. Fairfield wrong in the course which he pursued? Ought he not to have acted upon the evidence which he possessed and which we have already mentioned; or should he have waited until the sound of the enemy's cannon had given him indubitable notice of the invasion? The vigilance which he manifested on the occasion, is only another proof of his fitness for the office he holds; and that the Herald should find fault with it, simply shows that the conductors of that print are disposed to forget the honor and interests of their State in their unholly zeal to accomplish the purposes of party.

In relation to the charge of falsehood, which the Herald and the "venerable Mr. Davis," jointly make against Gov. Fairfield, we have little to say. Such an accusation is best met by the silent operation of public opinion, which rarely fails to make the slanderer, however insignificant he may be, bitterly repentant of his wrong. What the public opinion is, in the community where the Herald is published, we do not know; but we feel assured that the man who should here accuse John Fairfield of wilful falsehood, would be scourged, as a vile and worthless thing, by the united voice of both political parties.

We do not know how much the opinion of the Portland Gazette is worth, in the estimation of the Saco Herald, but as an indication of public feeling here, the Herald will see in that paper, of Saturday last, an editorial article which pays a deserved compliment to Gov. Fairfield, and bears witness to the triumph vindication of his character which was recently made in a public lecture delivered by General British. When any thing like justice is extorted from the "Old Portland," towards any Democrat, the merits of that Democrat must be "neither few or small;" and the Herald in undertaking to outrage all decency by slandering Gov. Fairfield, will find itself, perhaps, not even sustained by the papers of its own political sect.

EXTRACT from the Report made by Charles Jarvis, Esq., to the Land Agent.

BOOM ACROSS THE ST. JOHN'S.

The station at the mouth of Fish River is highly important, as commanding all the timber which floats down the St. John's and its tributary streams, the Allagash and the St. Francis. An Island in the St. John's on the southern side of the river, of between five and six acres, the lower end of which is just above the mouth of Fish River, may be connected with the main land on the south by a boom of about three hundred feet in length. To sustain this boom, one pier only will be required. Another boom of about the same length, may be extended from this pier across the mouth of Fish River. The counter currents formed by the junction of the two streams, will have a tendency to relieve these booms, by lessening the pressure of the timber. About eight rods above the upper end of the Island the St. John's River makes a short turn to the north, which causes the current to set upon the southern shore, and in time of spring freshets, and lumber floating down the river would be carried to the south of the Island, and three-fourths would of itself pass through the channel between the Island and the southern shore—although the main channel of the River is on the other side of the Island. A guide boom then extending from the upper part of the Island, towards the point made by the north bend of the River, not halfway across the main channel, and standing endways to the current, would direct every stick of timber into the southern channel, without opposing any obstructions to the navigation of the River on the north side of the Island. Indeed it would be difficult to conceive of a situation where a boom could be erected on so large a River, with so much security, at so little expense, and at the same time to answer so effectually the purpose intended. Towards effecting this object, however, nothing has as yet been done, farther than the taking possession of the ground by Alvin Nye, nor had he in fact at any time the means at his command. When we moved on to Fish River, in April last, it was in expectation only of securing the trespass timber on that river: the idea of booming the main St. John's from our want of knowledge of the advantages of the position at the mouth of Fish River, was considered as utterly chimerical. But even had they been known at this late season of the year, without a road, and no other way of approaching than the lakes and streams then breaking up, it would have been next to impossible to have transported the necessary tools and supplies. What would then have been difficult if not practicable, would now be easy of execution; and if it is determined to prevent future trespasses on the public lands on the waters of the St. John's, and its tributary streams above the Fish River, there cannot be a doubt as to the erection of a boom at this place.

Alvin Nye fully succeeded in stopping every stick of timber, and all the logs on Fish River, and with all the disadvantages under which he labored, want of tools and want of rigging, and late as it was when he took possession at the month, it being towards the last of May, he contrived to stop between six and eight hundred tons of timber, by means of a slight temporary boom stretched across the channel, between the Island and southern main land; but further than this, nothing had been done by him that deserves even a passing notice. At the time I am now describing my exclusive attention was directed, not to the construction of booms, but to the opening of a road to this station—which being accomplished, all the advantages of the position might be realized at convenience.

Road from the St. John's to the Aroostook.

On the 23d of October, I came through the road, which had been completed from the mouth of Fish River to the Aroostook, on company with a Madawaska settler in his wheel carriage, a French caleche, something between a chaise and a horse-car, having rather a closer affinity to the latter. The route was performed with ease, and without the slightest accident. From this day, then, may be dated the opening of the fine valley of the St. John's to the rest of the State, from which until now it has been separated by an impassable barrier of forty-five miles of unbroken forest.

Review of the operations the past Season.

From the foregoing statements of events connected with an inspection of the plan of the roads herewith submitted, an idea may be formed of the extensive scale of operations, which have been in progress the past season on the Aroostook territory. The expense incurred, was more than proportionally enhanced by the extent of those operations—yet it was rendered imperative, as the only means of saving the public lands from depredations, which for the last ten years must have amounted to no less than Four Hundred Thousand, and which in all probability have exceeded Six Hundred Thousand Dollars.

There is now an open communication from Houlton, to Presque Isle on the Aroostook, and thence to Fort Fairfield, within one mile of the line of the State, also from Bangor to the St. John's river, by the way of the Aroostook and Fish River roads—and a cross route on the southern side of the Aroostook, connecting these two important roads.

The annual plunder of the public lands by citizens of the Province of New Brunswick, amounted to near double the expense incurred in the construction of these roads. By means of them, that portion of territory lying on the waters of the St. John's comprising probably more than half of the Pine Timber of the State, is rendered accessible, and with due vigilance can be saved from further depredations. But important as are these considerations which alone would have justified the opening of those roads to such an extent in one year, yet the advantage to be derived is not confined to the security of the public property from pillage. From Monticello to the Aroostook and St. John's, including the branch to Fort Fairfield, one hundred and nine miles of road passes through land of the finest description, and that extent is open for settlement to the enterprising young men of our State, exempt from those hardships to which the first settlers in the wilderness, have been heretofore subjected, from the want of roads for the transportation of supplies. Those who are familiar with the many inconveniences arising from this cause alone will accord in the estimate that the land on each side of the road has more than doubled in value. The amount of labor expended on the opening each road, will appear from the returns of the several superintendents. To ascertain precisely the cost of the provisions expended, is not within my power, as the transportation constituted a considerable portion of that cost, and as there was no discrimination between the provisions used on the road and that consumed by the men at Fort Fairfield and Fish River. The nearest approximation to that expense, is to be attained by a charge of the board of the men, which being estimated at fifty cents per day, will not vary materially from the truth. On which estimate, a summary of the cost of each road, with a short description of the same, will now be given; and for further detail, you are referred to the accounts rendered, giving the number of day's work performed by each man employed.

Houlton Road. From Fort Fairfield to Portland Academy Grant, thirty one miles and thirty six rods, passing through Letter D 1st Range, Letter G and F 2d Range, Deerfield Grant, Mars Hill Township, Letter B 1st Range and Bridge-water Academy Grant viz: thirteen miles one hundred sixty rods, Maine land; seven miles forty rods, Massachusetts land; ten miles one hundred sixty rods, belonging to proprietors unknown.

13 Bridges, aggregate length 886 feet, built by Maddox and J. Johnson, viz:
724 days' labor cost \$452 81
724 days' board at 3s., 371 00
1233 81

Whole cost of road exclusive of
Bridges, 865 51 1/2
Average length of bridges, sixty eight feet.

Fish River Road. From the Aroostook to the St. John's River, 44 1/2 miles, passing through No. 8, 11 and 12 in Range 5th, No. 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, Range 6th, No. 16, Range 7th, and the undivided lands north of Norris's survey, viz: 23 1/2 miles Maine lands, 10 miles Massachusetts, and 11 miles undivided lands.

Labor under James Simmons, board included, clearing Machias streams and Portage road, 240 21

Bridge across thoroughfare 203 feet, 634 80
Bridge do. Wallograss, 180 feet 423 50

Cost of road, exclusive of Bridges, 87210 88

St. Croix Road. From the Houlton road, crossing the Presque Isle at Fairbanks's on the south side of the Aroostook river to the Aroostook road, partially opened by Purinton, some years since, 23 miles 96 rods, passing through Letter F, and Letter G, 2d Range, No. 12, 3d Range, No. 12, 4th Range, and No. 11, 5th Range, viz: 14 miles 96 rods Maine lands and 9 miles Massachusetts lands.

1592 day's work cost 1090 02
1592 day's board at 3s., 790 00
Use of tools 23 0-20 miles, at 86, 193 80
\$2073 82

Bridge across Presque Isle, 378 feet, by Jacob Johnson, 516 22
400 days' cost 233 00
Plank and timber, 35 39
784 61

23 0-20 miles road at 86 87 per mile, is \$2026 40.

In addition to those above described, a road has also been laid out from the mouth of the Presque Isle one and a half miles to the Houlton road at Fairbanks's, which has been so far opened as to answer the purpose of a winter road. This road was undertaken by Hobart, who lives at the mouth of the Presque Isle to be cut out twelve feet wide, and the cradle knolls thoroughly leveled, on my written engagement to allow one hundred and fifty dollars for the same, and one dollar per rod for such causeways as might be necessary. He not having been able to accomplish the work this fall, I have agreed to let him finish it next summer paying him in proportion to the work done, which I have estimated and given a certificate accordingly. Two miles and a half of the road have also been made, and a bridge built across the Meduxenekeag, our letter A, a township in possession of Gen. Wellington. The amount expended on the road was \$180 22—on the bridge \$480 81—in all \$660 93, detailed accounts of which have been rendered to be reimbursed to the State by the proprietors. This expenditure was necessary to realize the advantages to be derived from the opening of the road, from the Portland Academy Grant to Fort Fairfield, which otherwise would have been in a great measure lost to the State. The remaining three miles and a half of road in that township, which we were prevented from making, by being put under contract by the proprietor, is now decidedly the worst part of the whole route between Houlton and the St. John's, and it is to be hoped that before another year it will be made, either voluntary or by a compulsory process.

The twelve miles from the Aroostook to the St. Croix, in part opened by Purinton, under contract with the two States, some years since, had been commenced by James McCann only a few days before I left Fort Fairfield. By returns since received from him, I have learned the amount expended to the 3d December was \$472-55, and that the road would be completed as a good winter road in the course of another week. The whole cost will probably amount to about \$530 00. Including the three last pieces above named, one hundred and fourteen miles of road will have been opened this season on the territory; and seventeen Bridges, averaging one hundred and thirteen feet in length have been built. Thirty-six miles of this road has been busted out, from two to three rods in width, the windfalls thrown out, and the trees effectually girdled; causeways, from twelve to sixteen feet in width, have been laid, and the cradle knolls leveled from ten to twelve feet in width.

Seventy-eight miles have been cut out, from ten to twelve feet in width—causeways of the same width have been laid over the mire places, and the cradle knolls leveled. With the exception of the twelve miles from the St. Croix, to the Aroostook, and the one and a half miles from the mouth of the Presque Isle to the Houlton road the whole distance is practicable for two-horse wagon, carrying a load from 10 to 12 cwt; and by reference to the preceding journal, it will be readily perceived, that nearly the whole has been effected in less than four months from the 22d July, the time of Dunning's commencing, to the 15th day of November, the day of the discharge of the men from the St. Croix road. In the prosecution of such extensive operations in the wilderness, many embarrassments were of course unavoidable, but they have been encountered, surmounted, and the work has been accomplished. To dilate farther on the advantages attendant would be superfluous—they must be obvious to every one, who has given the slightest consideration to what has been before said.

In justice to those who have been engaged with me, I am bound to state that the overseers of parties on the roads and bridges, have been stimulated by a praiseworthy emulation—the best spirit has prevailed among the men; if dissatisfaction has existed, it has not met my ears, and with but few exceptions, all have appeared desirous of doing their duty. That, in common with others, I have strongly participated in this desire you know—and the State, I hope will do me the justice to believe; and I have assurance in this hope, from the consciousness that no exertion has been spared on my part, to carry into execution to the fullest extent, the expectations of the public.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
CHARLES JARVIS.

From the Correspondence of the Eastern Argus. AUGUSTA, Feb. 1st, 1840.

Our excellent Chaplain, Rev. Mr. Ingraham, evinced in his prayer this morning a spirit of piety and patriotism such as animated the Scotch covenanters, when they contested with the powers of bigotry and persecuting tyranny, for freedom of faith and opinion. He alluded in thankful terms to the former spirit of the "Old Country," to fix our by boundaries right bounds and limits. He adverted to our present spirit or inclination to trespass upon our rights and wrest from us our territory—and pronounced in Scripture phrase, the was upon those who would remove their neighbors' landmarks. He invoked the God of our Fathers to stand by us, in every emergency, sustain us in asserting our rights in any manner which Heaven should direct—to shield us alike from the commission and the power of wrong, and lead us in all our concerns to a right and righteous issue. This petition of our chaplain was listened to with ardent interest, and its spirit, strong in holiness, I trust finds a response in every bosom here. Such was the interest felt and expressed in this prayer, that I have, in accordance with many requests and my own intention, given it a passing and imperfect notice. 'Twas worthy a descendant of the Puritans.

This image shows a vertical, high-contrast black and white photograph. On the left side, there is a narrow, light-colored strip that appears to be the edge of a book binding or a piece of wood, showing some texture and wear. The rest of the image is a dark, almost black, textured surface that looks like a book cover or a piece of dark material. There are some faint, horizontal lines and a small, curved mark visible on the dark surface.

[Continued from the second page.]

Who so blind as not to see the disastrous consequences of bringing the States to the footstool of the Federal Government, to receive supplies from the public Treasury? Wasteful extravagance in their expenses, with ultimate object dependence on the Federal head, with consolidation in its train, is one alternative of the consequences which presents itself; annihilation of the Federal head, by the loss of its revenues and property, which might be devoured by the States, is the other alternative of the same disastrous consequences. It may be a question which would occur—whether the States would be swallowed up by the Federal head, or whether the Federal head would be devoured by the States; most probably the latter; but one of them inevitably; and the result would be the same to our present frame of Government, be it which it might. We have encountered and surmounted many dangers; we have gone through many perils which tried the strength of our federative system; but of all the dangers we have surmounted, of all the trials we have gone through, there are none, in my opinion, which can compare with the perilous experiment of supplying the States out of the Federal Treasury.

Who does not see the new and fearful impulse which the assumption of the State debts, or a provision for their payment out of the general funds, must give to the delusive and destructive paper system? Already in a state of frightful overaction, the votaries of that system deem nothing done while the Federal Government is free from its vortex. With nine hundred banks to emit paper money; with six hundred millions of authorized bank capital; with more than one thousand millions of stocks of all sorts; with five hundred banks in a state of suspension; with one hundred millions of depreciated bank paper, including post notes; with two hundred millions borrowed by eighteen States from Europe; with twenty-eight millions received on deposit from the United States; with a mammoth bank of thirty-five millions, chartered for thirty years, the identical personification of the credit system, with its two bankruptcies in two years, its first duty to foreigners, and its last to its own country, exporting ship loads of specie to these foreigners while refusing shillings to those who chartered it; with all this we are still at the commencement of the paper credit system. A national debt and a national bank are the two pillars of that system; and to obtain that debt and that bank is now the main object of pressing the State debts upon the Federal Government. Let that object be accomplished; let a new national debt be created, and the new national bank grow out of it, and the credit system will quickly produce the fruits here which it has already borne in England, and where, in less than a century and a half, it has raised a national debt from twenty-one millions five hundred and fifteen thousand seven hundred and forty-two pounds thirteen shillings and sixpence and two farthings, to nine hundred millions sterling; the annual taxes from four millions, to forty-five millions sterling; the National Bank from one million two hundred thousand pounds, to fourteen millions; and, as a consequence of the whole, has filled the country with millionaires and beggars, with palaces and poor-houses. Give the credit system the new impulse which it seeks here, and it will soon supply our America with the fruits which it has borne in England.

The effect of all this policy in begetting a passion for periodical distributions of land revenue, or surplus revenue, or extensions of national credit, will be to put the people of this Union into that road which the Romans entered when they commenced a distribution of grain from the public granaries, and ended with putting up the conscription to sale, and the diadem of empire to auction. It is a passion which grows on what it feeds, and becomes insatiate in proportion to what it devours. On this point we have the instruction of our recent experience to guide us, as well as the suggestions of an enlightened forecast to warn us. I have already said that assumption is the child of distribution—the child of the projects and speeches for the distribution of land revenue or surplus revenue—which have excited and tantalized the public mind for so many years past. I have said it was this which stimulated the States into improvident undertakings, rushed them headlong into heavy debts, and turned their eyes upon the national domain, and the Federal Treasury, for succor and relief from their premature burthens. This is what I have said; and now look at the proof in the table of the progressive growth and increase of the State debts which I have already mentioned to you. Here it is. See it. From 1820 to 1825, when none of the distribution schemes had been thought of in Congress, the amount of State debt incurred was only twelve millions and three quarters, in five years—barely two and a half millions per annum—and this confined to the old and populous States, whose resources were adequate to their undertakings, and whose means were equal to the payment of their contracts.

In the next period of five years, from 1825 to 1830, the increase of the State debts was still in the same slow and moderate proportion, and confined to the same class of States. Mr. Dickerson's bill for the distribution of the surplus revenue was brought forward during this period; but its instant and peremptory condemnation by the Senate counteracted its influence, and prevented it from having the least effect in stimulating the expenditures of the States, or exciting the spirit of speculation; and the State debts, in these five years, only advanced thirteen and a half millions of dollars, being still at the moderate rate of little more

than two and a half millions per annum. The third period, from 1830 to 1835, was filled with bills and speeches for the distribution of land revenue, and majorities were found in both Houses of Congress to countenance the projects, and to inflame the passions which they engendered. Then it was that speculation and State debt received a powerful impulse, and the debts of the States made the gigantic stride of forty millions in five years; being at the rate of eight millions of dollars per annum. What was worse, some of the young States began to be infected with the heresy that State debts were State blessings, and rushed into undertakings for which they were not ripe, and for which the credit system had to furnish the means. The fourth period—for I still quote from the invaluable tables of Mr. Flagg—only embraced three years and a half, from 1835 to 1837, and a part of 1838; but it covered the period of the cluster of bills for the distribution of the surplus revenue, as it was called, the seductive speeches in their favor, and the dazzling tables of distributive shares, which then filled this chamber, and which took the ultimate form of a deposit with the States. The State debts, in that delusive period, advanced one hundred and eighty millions of dollars! counting the twenty-eight millions received from the United States, and the total advance was one hundred and thirty-eight millions! the progressive rate of increase being close on forty millions of dollars per annum. This frightful career of debt involved in its course even the youngest and weakest States, and some of the Territories; and the result of the whole was a larger debt contracted in that brief period by about one half of the States, than the whole Union owed at the highest point of our national debt, for all its wars, and acquisitions of territory—the Revolutionary war, the Louisiana, and Florida purchases, all inclusive!

This is what came from stimulating the appetite of the States for public distributions; this is what came from turning their eyes upon the national domain and the Federal Treasury for the payment of their debts. This is the fruit of our land bills, our distribution bills, and our deposit bills; and this is what I said would be their fruit, and a great deal more, during the many years that, almost "solitary and alone," it made head against them on this floor. This being the result of our experience, what must be the effect of now surrendering the national domain to the payment of these debts? Certainly to start the States again in a new career of debts, to excite them into extravagance, under the conviction that they are not to pay, and to bring them periodically upon Congress, with fresh demands, until the national domain shall be exhausted, the Federal Treasury emptied, and the credit of the Union reduced to contempt.

I am willing to speak as gently as possible of this deposit act. I wrote its history in advance when I spoke against it at the time of its passage—my friends, all except five, joined in passing it. I denounced it as a disguised distribution, as a mock evasion of the Constitution, and as a course to the States which were to commence the practice of receiving supplies from the Federal Treasury. It is not my purpose to repeat what I then said, by way of self commendation, but it is pertinent and profitable at present to look to the actual effect of this deposit act upon the States, how it inflamed some with the notion of inexhaustible supplies from the Federal Government; rushed them into debts for unnecessary, or unwise undertakings; engendered a spirit of wasteful extravagance; and, instead of relieving the States from taxes, has largely augmented the burthen of taxation. The States, most of them, are, beyond all comparison, infinitely worse off now than they were before they received their unfortunate distribution from the Federal Government. So I declared it would be when the act passed; so I declare it will be again, and worse, if we go on and supply them out of the Federal Treasury. Their relief is in the resort to their own resources, and in the ECONOMY which such a resort begets and enforces.

Such are the faint outlines of the mischiefs this assumption, disguised and covered up as it may be with the cloak of distribution, or deposit. They are frightful and appalling, and must fill with apprehension the bosom of every friend to the harmony and duration of the Federal Union. But, frightful as they are, there is still another feature to be added to the picture, to increase its deformity, and to perfect its title to unmitigated horror and detestation. That feature is the crowning mischief of foreign interference and foreign influence! Every one knows that these State debts are due in Europe, where they constitute a stock which is sold from hand to hand, and which is greatly depreciated. The elevation of this stock to par, or above, is an object of the first magnitude with present holders; and the way to elevate it is to extend its basis, and make it the debt of the whole, instead of a part, of the States. Many agents or emissaries, in the interest of the foreign holders, had suggested it here. The whole of our citizens who visited Europe, especially those in public station, were sounded and consulted about it. Finally, things were ripe for a public revelation, and the authentic proposition for the assumption appeared, emanating from one of the most respectable banking houses in London, the head of which is the present Chancellor of the British Exchequer, and a peer of the realm of Great Britain. The house is that of the well known Messrs. Baring, Brothers, and Company, and the part of their letter which particularly relates to the assumption is this:

"But if the whole scheme of internal improvements in the Union, is to be carried into effect on the vast

scale, and with the rapidly lately projected, and by the means of foreign capital, a more comprehensive guarantee than that of individual States will be required to raise so large an amount in so short a time. A national pledge would undoubtedly collect capital together from all parts of Europe; but the forced sales of loans made separately through a number of channels, in reckless competition, through a number of channels, render the terms more onerous for all, lower the reputation of American credit, and (as the result is almost exclusively placed on the London market) produce temporary mischief here, by absorbing the floating capital, diverting money from regular business, deranging banking operations, and producing an unnatural balance of trade against this country. It would seem, therefore, as if most of the States must either pause in the execution of their works of improvement, or some general system of combination must be adopted."

Such are the terms of this important letter; very delicately expressed, the proposition hypothetically predicated, and the object handsomely veiled with the seductive show of an accommodation and favor to the United States. Nothing could be more unexceptionable than the language in which these bankers have brought forward their scheme; but it is for us to look at the object distinctly, which they faintly disclose. This object is nothing more nor less than for the United States to become bound in any way they please, for the payment of the debts of the individual States. It is a great object with these bankers, and with the capitalists of London, Paris, and Amsterdam. The debts are of great amount; they are greatly depreciated; and they are due from parties which present the anomaly of being neither suitable nor coercible, though able to contract, and morally bound to comply with their contracts. The sources of the expected means of payment, namely, the profits from banking, road making, and canal making, must fail with many; and while eventual and full compliance with their bonds may be expected from all, yet a literal and punctual discharge of their obligations must fall on the part of some. All this is known, seen, and felt in Europe; hence the depreciation of the stocks, and hence the natural desire to obtain the guarantee of a party, less anomalous in character, more abundant in means, and more perfect in credit. The object is great; the party interested in the application is powerful; success to them is worth many ten millions of dollars; and to have success, they must operate upon the public opinion, and upon the legislation of this country. They must go to the press, to the elections, to the State Legislatures, and to the Congress of the Union. They must operate at all points, upon the individual citizens, and upon the constituted authorities; and they must operate by the means, and the only means, known to the moneyed power. Here, then, is a case of foreign influence in our affairs, and of foreign influence in our councils, more dangerous to the purity and stability of our institutions, and more to be dreaded by us, than the forcible invasion of our country by foreign fleets and armies. It is a case in which an ass, loaded with gold, is more to be dreaded than the war-horse, whose neck is clothed with thunder.

I do not dilate upon the evils of a foreign influence. They are written upon the historical page of every free Government, from the most ancient to the most modern; they are among those most deeply dreaded, and most sedulously guarded against by the founders of the American Union. The Constitution itself contains a special canon directed against them. To prevent the possibility of this foreign influence, every species of foreign connection, dependence or employment, is constitutionally forbid to the whole list of our public functionaries. The inhibition is express and fundamental, that "no person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, shall, without the consent of Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign State." All this was to prevent any foreign potentate from acquiring partisans or influence in our Government—to prevent our own citizens from being seduced into the interests of foreign powers. Yet, to what purpose all these constitutional provisions against petty sovereignties, if we are to invite the moneyed power which is able to subsidize kings, princes, and potentates; if we are to invite this new and master power into the bosom of our councils, give it an interest in controlling public opinion, in directing Federal and State legislation, and in filling our cities and seats of Government with its insinuating agents, and its munificent and lavish Representatives? To what purpose all this wise precaution against the possibility of influence from the most inconsiderable German or Italian prince, if we are to invite the combined bankers of England, France, and Holland, to take a position in our legislative halls, and by a simple enactment of a few words, to convert their hundreds of millions into a thousand millions, and to take for generations to come. The largest moneyed operation which we ever had with any foreign power, was that of the purchase of Louisiana from the Great Emperor. That was an affair of fifteen millions. It was insignificant and contemptible, compared to the hundreds of millions for which these bankers are now opening. And are we, while guarded by the Constitution against influence from an Emperor and fifteen millions, to throw ourselves open to the machinations of bankers, with their hundreds of millions?

It is not the Constitution only, but the whole early history of our Government which is full of this jealousy and precaution against foreign influence. Our Government went into operation with a contest upon this point, and with a division of political parties upon it. The Federalists and the Democracy divided upon it; the former headed by General Hamilton, the latter by Mr. Jefferson. To impose upon us the funding system, the banking system, the

credit system of England, was the aim of one of the parties; to prevent these impositions was the aim of the other. One party pushed all these systems, with a national debt and a National Bank for their basis; the other labored to preserve the hard money Government which had been made by hard money men; and to prevent that imitation of the British systems, and dependence upon them, which must end in subjecting us to the pecuniary as well as political influence of the English. The Federalists prevailed. The genius of Hamilton, and his position at the head of the Treasury, gave him the victory. The British systems were all imposed upon us, and the result has been precisely what was foreseen by the Democracy forty-five and fifty years ago. We have become the victims of those whose institutions we copied; and thirty years' convulsion of our moneyed system attests the miserable subjection to which we have been reduced. The infamous and traitorous sentiment that our first duty is to foreigners, has become the sentiment of enough to make it the action of the country, and to make the Federal Government, the State Governments, and the people, the victims of its treasonous consequences.

From this sentiment it results that our banks are to be broken just as often as it is necessary to break them, to save the banks in England; that our gold and silver must be exported, and our Government and our citizens deprived of specie for marketing, for postages, for traveling expenses, or for taxes, just as often and just as long as the English require our hard money to be sent to them; that all our moneyed operations must be made to depend on the news which the next English steamer may bring out; and that the price of property, labor, and produce must be made to rise and fall all over the United States precisely as ordered and directed by the moneyed power in London. Our President has faithfully depicted this state of degradation, subjection and injury, in that part of his message in which he says that our money system has its centre in London; that all our banks are linked together by a chain of dependence which ends there; that not only the great cities, but the remote villages of the interior, are linked to this chain; that the establishment of a new bank in the most distant village of our Union immediately places the business of that village within the influence of the money power of England; and that the result of the whole is the periodical convulsions and bank suspensions to which we are subject, and the establishment of a dangerous foreign influence in our bosom. These are the declarations of the President; and these declarations we all know to be a faithful history of what we suffer. We know the curse of our country at this moment, its broken banks, depreciated paper money, and sickening demoralization, is the effect of our subjection to the moneyed oligarchy in England and that subjection is the fruit of our copying her delusive systems—her paper system and funding system—nearly fifty years ago. Since the revival of the Democratic party, we have been endeavoring to throw off this subjection, and return to the hard money system created for us by the hard money men who framed what they intended to be a hard money Government. We have made some progress towards this return to the true principles of our Government, when we find ourselves beset by the danger of falling into greater subjection than ever. About one half of the States have linked themselves to the chain whose end is in London; and the moneyed power in London seizes the opportunity to increase the strength and weight of the chain, by linking all the rest of the States to it. This is the struggle that is now before us, and in which foreign capitalists must find so great a temptation to interfere, and in which they count on the aid of the indebted States to involve the others, and the whole Union, in their own unfortunate condition.

To make head against all these evils, while we are able to do so; to still foreign interference in its cradle; to repulse the insidious approach of assumption in the disguise of a land revenue distribution; to enable ourselves to go on with the appropriate business of Congress, to think it right to anticipate the attack, and to put an end to hope and future efforts, by adopting resolutions of the tenor and character which I have had the honor to offer.

Mr. President, in conclusion, permit me to turn one word towards myself for the sake of doing justice to others. Among those events of my life for which I have reason to be thankful, was the circumstance of being admitted into the intimacy and friendship of Mr. Macon and Mr. Randolph at my entrance into this body. I lived in the same house for many years with these two illustrious sages and patriots, and from them I learnt to abhor the paper system of England, fastened upon us by General Hamilton, and to venerate the hard money Government framed for us by our ancestors, and taken from us by the Federalists of nearly fifty years ago. Our Constitution was pushed from her foundations as she went into operation; she was pushed off the solid rock of hard money, where our ancestors anchored her, and plunged into the tempestuous ocean of paper. It has been tossed near fifty years in that ocean; but is now settling back to her old foundations. The administrations of Jackson and Van Buren are bringing her back; and all my labors now—all my labors for many years—have been directed to that consummation, and to the relief of our country from its degrading, ruinous, and demoralizing dependence on the destructive and delusive paper system of Great Britain. To break the chain which now binds us to the footstool of the moneyed power of London—at all events to prevent that chain from being made heavier and stronger—is one of the objects of submitting these resolutions; and I invoke for

them, and for what I have said in their support, the candid consideration of the Senate and the country.

NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE.
WHEREAS, Oliver Griswold, of Freyburg, in the county of Oxford, and State of Maine, physician, deceased, by his Deed, dated the tenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, recorded in the Oxford Registry of Deeds, in the twenty-seventh day of the same July, Liber nine, Folio forty and forty-one, conveyed to Catherine Codman, of Boston, in the county of Suffolk, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, widow, and Common-law Wife and Underment the undersigned is Executor, the following described tract of intervals land, situate in and Freyburg, and bounded as follows, viz: beginning at a stake and stones on the westerly side of Saco river, and running north forty-five degrees, west by the original line of Freyburg and Brownfield eighty-two rods and eight feet to a stone bound, being on the line of a piece of land containing three acres, formerly conveyed by the late Henry Young Brown to Philip Codman; thence running north eighty-three degrees, west forty-five rods and two links, or thereabouts, to New Hampshire line; thence by New Hampshire line to a stone; thence south eighty-one degrees, east one hundred and seven rods, by an oak tree spotted, to another tree on the bank of Saco river, and thence on the same course to the Saco river; thence by and down Saco river, as it tends to the bounds begun at; continuing, after deducting two hundred and nineteen square rods, laid out and occupied for a town road, thirty-one acres, three rods, and twenty-one square rods; being the same conveyed to said Griswold by said Catherine Codman and Elizabeth Codman, which Deed was a deed of Mortgage conditional, for the payment of fourteen hundred and twenty-five dollars and sixty-six cents, in three equal annual payments, with interest from the date of said mortgage. And the condition of said Mortgage having been broken, I, as the Executor of the last Will and Testament of the said Catherine Codman, and for the benefit of the said Highways tax for A. D. 1837, in bills committed to me the undersigned Collector of said Freyburg, and remain unpaid as follows, to wit:

COLLECTOR'S NOTICE.—Waterford.

NOTICE is hereby given to the non resident proprietors and owners of land in Waterford, in the county of Oxford, that the same are taxed for A. D. 1838, for County and Town Taxes—School District tax, and in satisfaction of the Highway tax for A. D. 1837, in bills committed to me the undersigned Collector of said Freyburg, and remain unpaid as follows, to wit:

Owner's name.	Acres.	Valued.	County.	State.	Total.
Calvin Powers,	1 0 60	50 \$125			50 \$218
Ellen Jewett,		50 125 3 00			3 00
John Green,		50 125 1 87			1 87
Lea Watson		60 160 1 87			1 87
L. C. Jones's	2 50	1 25			1 25
house & land,					
W. C. Whitney	2 566	13 75			13 75
W. C. Whitney		11 25			11 25
Summer Stand,	183 450	11 25			11 25
farm,					
W. C. Whitney	814 80	245 1 13			1 13
do. W. part	7 14	2 30			2 30
W. C. Whitney	12 12 10	25			25
W. C. Whitney	11 13 26	12 30			12 30
undivided lot					
Ruth Chad-	12 3 100	75 1 25			1 25
born's farm,					
Eugene Car-		16 100 2 50			2 50
ter's farm,					
Sam'l Wheel-		50 50 1 25			1 25
er's farm,					
Unknown,	12 1 163	20			20
do. west half	12 5 30	20			20
J. Chidborn	1 9 50	40 1 00			1 00
C. F. Jones,	11 11 50	1 25			1 25
C. F. Jones,	11 12 100	25 63			25 63
Unknown,	11 6 20	35			35
W. C. Whitney	113 160	25			25
Levi Green,	5 1 15	37			37
all's house,					
W. E. Haskin	46 225	416 4 16			4 16
farm,					
Calvin Powers,	314 160	160			1 65
W. Foster N. p. 3	1 18 20	63			63
Dan'l Green,	1 1 31	15			15
west part,					
Jas Chidborn	414 160	160			2 17

Now unless said taxes and all necessary intervening charges are paid, I shall proceed to sell at public auction to the highest bidder, of the house of William N. Jones, in said Waterford, on Monday, the eleventh day of May next, 1838, so much of said lands as will be sufficient to discharge said taxes and necessary charges.

ROSLAND H. GERRY,

Collector of Waterford for the year 1838.

Waterford, Jan. 21, 1838.

GUARDIAN'S SALE.

By virtue of license from the Probate Court of the County of Oxford, I shall sell at Public Auction, on Monday the twentieth day of April next, at two o'clock, P. M., the personal and real estate of all persons deceased, the estate of Melrose S. Frye, Lydia A. Frye, Constance C. Frye, minor children of John H. Frye, late of Freyburg, deceased, in and to the homestead farm of the late father, situated in Freyburg, consisting of three-fifths of the land, farm, and out-buildings, and two-fifths of the dwelling house. Said farm is situated on a constant forty-four acres of intervals, and fifty-eight acres of upland, on which there are a good wood lot, a good house and barn, a well finished dwelling house, a corn house and barn, and two good wells of water. Sale on the premises. Terms made known at the time and place of sale.

THOMAS S. EVANS,

Guardian of said Estate.

Freyburg, Jan. 25, 1838.

The remainder of said farm will be sold at the time and place aforesaid, reserving therefrom one third of the dwelling house and cellar, for the use and during the life of Miss Lydia Frye.

3a25

J. T. CLARK,

SADDLE, HARNESS, AND TRUNK

MAKER,

HAS taken the stand formerly occupied by N. M. W. Manah, where will be found a good assortment of Harness work, which he will sell cheap for Cash or Country Produce.

500 bushels of OATS wanted in exchange for the above, for which the highest price will be paid.

Paris, Dec. 10, 1837.

17 17

ANDREW THOMPSON,

TAILOR.

RESPECTFULLY informs the inhabitants of Paris Crocker & Shaw's Store, on Paris Hill, where all business in his line will be promptly and faithfully attended to. He respectfully solicits a share of public patronage. Cutting done at short notice.

Paris, August, 15 1837.

17

BUFFALO ROBES.

A prime lot just received and for sale by the subscriber, also, Fur Collars, Neck Ties, Muffs, Winter Fur Goggles, &c. &c. W. E. GOODNOW.

Norway-Village, Nov. 18, 1837.

17

Almanacs for 1840.

JUST received and for sale by the dozen or single lot at the Oxford Bookstore, by

W. E. GOODNOW.

November 18, 1839.

17

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